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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This case presents the jurisdictional question of the 
citizenship of an inactive corporation under the federal 
diversity statute.  We conclude that an inactive corporation is a 
citizen of the state of its incorporation only.  Having so 
concluded, and thus having determined that the district court 
had, and we have, jurisdiction, we are also called upon to 
address the meaning of the term "joint applicant" under the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act.  Because we agree with the district 
court's conclusion that one of the defendants, Mrs. Eileen 
Hansen, was a joint applicant for a loan for purposes of the Act, 
we will affirm. 
 I. 
 Midlantic National Bank ("Midlantic") is a national 
banking association with its principal place of business in 
Edison, New Jersey.  Appellants Elmer and Eileen Hansen are 
citizens of Pennsylvania and are the joint owners of all the 
issued and outstanding stock of Hansen Bancorp, Inc. ("HBI").  
  
HBI, now inactive, is a corporation organized under the laws of 
the state of Delaware.  HBI owned the stock of two thrift 
institutions, the Hansen Savings Bank of Florida and the Hansen 
Savings Bank, SLA, in New Jersey.1 
 Beginning in 1985, the Hansens obtained several loans 
from Midlantic.  The Hansens used the first Midlantic loan to 
finance the purchase of a New Jersey thrift institution, the 
Raritan Valley Savings and Loan Association located in East 
Brunswick, New Jersey.  As collateral for this loan, the Hansens 
pledged the Raritan stock to Midlantic.  As part of their loan 
application, the Hansens submitted a Consolidated Statement of 
Net Worth and a Consolidated Income Statement.  The Notes to the 
Consolidated Statement of Net Worth, which explain the basis of 
consolidation, report that "E.F., Jr. and G.E. Hansen, his wife, 
operate their business, Hansen Properties ("Hansen"), as a sole 
proprietorship."  The Notes then list limited partnerships of 
which the Hansens were the only partners or the only principals.  
(Plaintiffs/Appellees' Appendix ("Pa.") at 487)  In addition, on 
the Acquisition Agreement between Raritan Valley Financial 
Corporation and the Hansens, the Hansens are listed as joint 
purchasers of the Raritan stock. 
 During 1987 and 1988 the Hansens used an additional 
Midlantic loan to purchase a controlling interest in a Florida 
                     
1
.   The Hansens refer to these thrift entities by different 
names, calling the Florida thrift the Hansen Savings Midlantic of 
Florida, and the New Jersey thrift the Hansen Savings Midlantic, 
SLA. 
  
thrift later renamed the Hansen Savings Bank of Florida (HSB of 
FL).  This loan was secured by a pledge of HSB of FL stock.  At 
this time the Hansens consolidated their indebtedness to 
Midlantic into a single loan in the amount of $13 million. 
 In February, 1989, the Hansens and Midlantic executed a 
Second Amended and Restated Loan Agreement, by which terms the 
Hansens and HBI were jointly and severally liable on a 
$13,166,666.69 term note payable to Midlantic.  At the same time, 
the Hansens signed a separate One Million Dollar Term Note 
payable to Midlantic, under which they were also jointly and 
severally liable.  One month later the Hansens signed an 
additional note for two million dollars.  For all these loans the 
Hansens pledged as security the stock in HBI and its 
subsidiaries, HSB of FL and the Hansen Savings Bank, SLA. 
 In March of 1989, the Hansens borrowed an additional 
two million dollars from Midlantic, and in mid-1990, the Hansens 
and Midlantic executed two Demand Notes for $100,000 each. 
 By September of 1990, the Hansens were in default on 
several of their Midlantic loans.  The parties then entered into 
a Loan Coordination, Security and Intercreditor Agreement, in 
which Midlantic agreed to postpone acceleration of sums due under 
the already executed notes until the earlier of either June 30, 
1991, or a default under the Intercreditor Agreement.  By 1992 
the Hansens were in default on the Intercreditor Agreement. 
 In January, 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision and 
the Resolution Trust Corporation seized control of the Hansens' 
Florida and New Jersey thrifts.  HBI was rendered inactive by 
  
this seizure.2  Midlantic initiated this collection action six 
months later, on June 25, 1992, for the recovery of the amounts 
loaned by Midlantic to the Hansens.  Midlantic's complaint bases 
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332.  
 The district court denied a motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction filed by the Hansens and, on 
January 6, 1993, granted Midlantic's motion for summary judgment.  
On January 26, 1993, the district court entered final judgment in 
favor of Midlantic.  The Hansens filed their notice of appeal on 
February 25, 1993.  In their appeal of the district court's entry 
of summary judgment, the Hansens challenge the existence of 
federal diversity jurisdiction as well as the propriety of 
Midlantic's requiring Mrs. Hansen to sign the loan applications.  
In turn, Midlantic claims that the Hansens failed to file a 
timely notice of appeal.  Because we find that the Hansens' 
notice of appeal was timely filed, we will consider the issues 
raised therein.  Because we agree with the district court on all 
of the issues raised, we will affirm. 
                     
2
.   The Hansens explain that "[a]s HBI is a holding company, 
and all of its holdings were seized, HBI was forced to cease 
actively engaging in business at this time[,]" and that "[s]ince 
the seizure, HBI has been an inactive corporation except for 
activities relating to the institution of litigation against the 
O[ffice of Thrift Supervision and other federal agencies."  
(Appellants' brief at 16). 
  
 II. 
 First, we must address whether the district court had 
jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case.  We exercise 
plenary review over issues of jurisdiction.  Mellon Bank v. 
Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1220 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 To satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(1), the federal diversity statute, diversity must be 
complete; that is, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same 
state as any of the defendants.  Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 
U.S. 185, 187 (1992); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. ITT 
Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1142 (3d Cir. 1972).  Whether 
diversity jurisdiction exists is determined by examining the 
citizenship of the parties at the time the complaint was filed.  
See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957) (stating that 
jurisdiction is tested by the facts as they exist when the action 
is brought).  Thus, the question before us is whether HBI was a 
citizen of New Jersey in June of 1992, when Midlantic filed its 
complaint.  If so, diversity of citizenship would not be complete 
since Midlantic is also a citizen of New Jersey. 
 For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, "a corporation 
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been 
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of 
business . . . ."  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).  The Hansens contend that 
HBI's principal place of business was New Jersey at the time 
  
Midlantic filed its complaint.3  The five month period between 
                     
3
.   According to the Hansens, at the beginning of 1991, HBI 
moved its headquarters from Pennsylvania to New Jersey.  In an 
affidavit submitted to the district court in connection with the 
Hansens' motion to dismiss, Jere A. Young, the Chairperson of the 
Board and Chief Executive Officer of HBI, alleged the following 
facts:  in early 1991, HBI transferred all of its books and 
records, including all accounting and financial records, to New 
Jersey; also in early 1991, all employees of HBI were either 
terminated or transferred to executive positions with HBI's New 
Jersey subsidiary, Hansen Savings Bank, SLA, or to Hansen Savings 
Bank's Pennsylvania subsidiary; from the beginning of 1991, the 
office of HBI's Chief Executive Officer was located in New 
Jersey; and, finally, from early 1991, "substantially all of the 
accounting, financial, corporate and legal activities of HBI were 
conducted from HBI's headquarters in Hammonton, New Jersey."  
(Defendants/Appellants' Appendix ("Da.") at 25). 
  
the time when HBI ceased to conduct business activities and the 
time Midlantic filed its complaint did not, the Hansens argue, 
dissipate HBI's local character for diversity purposes.  HBI's 
principal place of business for diversity purposes, according to 
the Hansens, was HBI's last principal place of business, that is, 
New Jersey. 
 In addressing the jurisdictional question in this case, 
we must resolve the issue of HBI's citizenship under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c), bearing in mind that HBI was an inactive corporation 
at the time the complaint was filed.4  The issue of the 
citizenship under Section 1332(c) of an inactive corporation is 
one of first impression in this circuit.  Essentially, the 
question before us is whether an inactive corporation can be 
deemed to have a "principal place of business" at all. 
 We gave meaning to the phrase "principal place of 
business" in Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d 
Cir. 1960), concluding that "corporate activities" determine the 
corporation's principal place of business.  Kelly, 284 F.2d at 
854.  Inasmuch as we consider the actual business activities of 
the corporation to be determinative of the corporation's 
principal place of business, we conclude that as a general 
matter, an "inactive" corporation (that is, a corporation 
conducting no business activities) has no principal place of 
                     
4
.   By "inactive" corporation, we mean a corporation that has 
ceased any and all business activities.  In the Young Affidavit, 
it is admitted that "[s]ince January 10, 1992, . . . HBI has had 
no active subsidiary company and no business activities."  (Da. 
at 26-27). 
  
business, and is instead a citizen of its state of incorporation 
only. 
 We thus further conclude that HBI, which was inactive 
at the time Midlantic filed its complaint, had no principal place 
of business under Section 1332 when this suit was commenced.  
When this lawsuit was commenced, HBI was a citizen of its state 
of incorporation only, namely, Delaware.  We therefore find that 
complete diversity is present in this case. 
 We acknowledge that the conclusion we reach today with 
regard to the citizenship of an inactive corporation conflicts 
with that reached by the Courts of Appeals for the Second and 
Fifth Circuits, the only two of our sister courts of appeals to 
have addressed the matter. 
 The Second Circuit opined that when a corporation 
ceases business activity, it is to be deemed a citizen both of 
its state of incorporation and of the state in which "it last 
transacted business . . . ."  Wm. Passalacqua Builders v. Resnick 
Developers, 933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991).  In so holding the 
Second Circuit placed principal reliance upon notions of 
congressional intent: 
 To allow inactive corporations to avoid 
inquiry into where they were last active 
would give them a benefit Congress never 
planned for them, since under such a rule a 
defunct corporation, no matter how local in 
character, could remove the case to federal 
court based on its state of incorporation. 
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 141.5 
                     
5
.   The Second Circuit also relied upon the fact that it had 
previously rejected the argument of a bankrupt that the district 
  
 The Fifth Circuit adopted a more flexible approach, 
holding that while the place of an inactive corporation's last 
business activity is relevant to the inquiry into the inactive 
corporation's principal place of business, it is not dispositive 
of the inquiry.  Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 
(5th Cir. 1992).  Instead, the court suggested, the amount of 
time elapsed between the date when the corporation ceased 
business activities and the date of the suit should assist in 
determining the relevance of the situs of the corporation's 
now-ceased business activities to the determination of the 
(..continued) 
court lacked jurisdiction because New York was not a place of 
business at least six months preceding the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.  Id. (citing Fada of New York, Inc. v. 
Organization Serv. Co., 125 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1942) (per curiam).  
"Because New York had been a principal place of business, we 
ruled[,]" the Wm. Passalacqua court observed, "that the 
bankruptcy petition had been properly filed in New York."  Id. 
 
 Fada is particularly instructive because the 
bankruptcy laws in effect at that time provided for 
jurisdiction either in the place of the corporation's 
domicile or in its principal place of business, and 
Congress amended § 1332(c) to follow these provisions 
 in the bankruptcy laws. 
 
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, 933 F.2d at 141 (citations omitted); 
but see Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.77[3.-1], 104 ("In the 
legislative history to the 1958 statute which injected the 
"principal place of business" criterion into the diversity 
statute, Congress specifically instructed courts to look to 
bankruptcy precedent for guidance in interpreting the phrase.  
Ample bankruptcy precedent existed, but consistent bankruptcy 
precedent did not.  Although the courts originally followed 
bankruptcy precedent -- conflicts and all -- the ensuing three 
decades have witnessed a significant emergence of general 
principles and criteria for making the jurisdictional 
determination."). 
  
corporation's principal place of business.  But where the 
corporation has been inactive in a state for "a substantial 
period of time, in this case five years,"6 the Harris court 
continued, that state, as a matter of law, is not the 
corporation's principal place of business.  Harris, 961 F.2d at 
551. 
 Our conclusion is also in conflict with that of several 
of the district courts to have considered the citizenship of an 
inactive corporation.  Most of the district courts to address the 
issue have found an inactive corporation to be the citizen both 
of its state of incorporation and of its last principal place of 
business.  See Comtec, Inc. v. National Technical Schools, 711 F. 
Supp. 522, 525 (D. Ariz. 1989); China Basin Properties v. 
Allendale Mut. Ins., 818 F. Supp. 1301, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992); 
China Basin Properties v. One Pass, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 
(N.D. Cal. 1993.)  As principal support for their position, these 
district courts proffer a plain meaning argument. 
 [W]hen Congress amended section 1332 to 
include a corporation's principal place of 
business as its state of incorporation 
through the use of the conjunctive "and," 
Congress could not have meant that a 
corporation's citizenship would be its 
principal place of business or its state of 
incorporation.  If Congress intended such a 
result, it clearly could have expressly 
stated as such.  Since there is nothing in 
section 1332 to suggest that a corporation's 
principal place of business should be ignored 
once that corporation becomes inactive, a 
                     
6
.   The question of the substantiality of the duration of 
inactivity, the court explained, must be determined on a case by 
case basis.  Id. at 551 n.10. 
  
strict reading of the statute requires this 
Court to utilize [the] last principal place 
of business in determining . . . [corporate] 
citizenship. 
China Basin Properties, 818 F. Supp. at 1304-05; see also Comtec, 
711 F. Supp. at 524 ("Section 1332(c) states that corporate 
diversity is based on both the place of incorporation and 
principal place of business.  By using the conjunction `and,' 
Congress intended for all of the requirements of the statute to 
be fulfilled."). 
 We believe the interpretation of Section 1332(c) that 
we adopt today most closely comports with the plain meaning of 
the statute.  We do not find persuasive the argument that 
Congress' use in 1332(c) of the conjunction "and" signifies that 
Congress intended that the courts strain to locate a principal 
place of business when no such place in reality exists.  We 
reject the notion that implicit in the statute's terms is the 
requirement that all corporations be deemed to have a principal 
place of business.  Far more significant to a plain meaning 
analysis, and thus far more indicative of congressional intent, 
is the fact that in Section 1332 Congress provided that a 
corporation is to be deemed a citizen of the state in which it 
has its principal place of business.  Congress could easily have 
provided that a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of the 
state in which it "has or has had" its principal place of 
business.  Clearly, however, Congress has provided no such thing. 
 We are mindful of the concern expressed in Wm. 
Passalacqua Builders and in several district court opinions, that 
  
the conclusion we reach today may, in certain cases, result in 
the subversion of the intent of Congress in amending 
Section 1332.7  We believe, however, that the benefits of 
certainty and clarity which obtain from the "bright line" 
approach we adopt outweigh the potential for the harm identified 
by the Second Circuit. 
 III. 
 We next address the timeliness of the Hansens' notice 
of appeal.  We find United States v. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 
U.S. 227 (1958), to be dispositive.  Indeed, this case mirrors 
Schaefer Brewing Co. in two significant respects:  first, as was 
the case in Schaefer Brewing Co., the case before us is one for 
the recovery of money only; second, as was the case in Schaefer 
Brewing Co., the district court's opinion and accompanying order 
granting summary judgment did not expressly or by reference 
specify the exact amounts Midlantic was entitled to recover 
thereon.  
 While . . . there is no statute or rule that 
specifies the essential elements of a final 
judgment, and this Court has held that "[n]o 
form of words and no peculiar formal act is 
necessary to evince [the] rendition [of a 
judgment]," yet it is obvious that a final 
judgment for money must, at least, determine, 
or specify the means for determining, the 
amount; and an opinion, in such a case, which 
does not either expressly or by reference 
determine the amount of money awarded reveals 
                     
7
.   It has been observed that through the principal place of 
business provision, "Congress purported to preclude what was in 
fact a local entity from suing (or being sued by) a local citizen 
in federal court simply because it was chartered in another 
state."  Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.77[3.-4]. 
  
doubt, at the very least, whether the opinion 
was a "complete act of adjudication" . . . or 
was intended by the judge to be his [or her] 
final act in the case. 
Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. at 233-34 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original). 
 Because the district court's January 7 opinion and 
order did not determine the exact amount of money Midlantic was 
entitled to receive pursuant to the issuance of summary judgment 
in its favor, we have little difficulty concluding that it 
neither embodies the essential elements of a judgment for money 
nor demonstrates the district court's intention that it 
constitute its final acts in this case.  See Mauriello v. Univ. 
of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 781 F.2d 46, 49 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Schaefer Brewing Co. for the proposition that to be 
final, a judgment for money must, at least, determine, or specify 
the means of determining, the amount of money awarded).  We 
conclude that the district court's January 7 order does not 
constitute a "judgment" or "order" within the terms of Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a), and that it is instead the district court's 
January 27 "Final Judgment" which constituted its final act in 
this case.  We therefore hold that the Hansens' February 25 
notice of appeal was timely filed because it was filed within 30 
days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. 
 IV. 
 Having determined that the district court had, and we 
have, jurisdiction over this case, we move to the remaining issue 
  
on appeal:  whether the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Midlantic. 
 The Hansens appeal the grant of summary judgment 
against them in light of their affirmative defense that Midlantic 
violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (the 
"ECOA") and Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1 et seq.  The Hansens 
claim that the existence of this affirmative defense raises a 
genuine issue of material fact which precluded the granting of 
summary judgment against them. 
 The district court rejected the Hansens' ECOA defense, 
finding that Mrs. Hansen was a bona fide joint applicant for the 
Midlantic loans.8  We agree with the district court's assessment 
of Mrs. Hansen's status and will affirm the district court's 
rejection of the Hansens' ECOA defense.9 
                     
8
.   The district court, as an initial matter, noted that a 
substantial argument can be made that a violation of the ECOA 
cannot be interposed as an affirmative defense, but must instead 
be pleaded as a counterclaim.  In fact, the courts are split on 
the question whether the ECOA may be used as an affirmative 
defense or may be asserted as a counterclaim only.  Compare 
American Security Midlantic v. York, 1992 WL 237375 (D. D.C. 
Sept. 1, 1992); FDIC v. Notis, 602 A.2d 1164 (Me. 1992) and In re 
Remington, 19 B.R. 718 (Bankr. D.Co. 1982), with Riggs Nat. Bank 
of Washington, D.C. v. Linch, 829 F. Supp 163 (E.D. Va. 1993); 
CMF Virginia Land, L.P. v. Brinson, 806 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Va. 
1992) and United States v. Joseph Hirsch Sportswear Co. Inc., 
1989 WL 20604 (E.D. N.Y. Feb. 28, 1989).  We do not address this 
issue because of our disposition of the Hansens' ECOA claim on 
other grounds. 
 
9
.   The Hansens also claim that the district court erred in not 
allowing them to continue discovery in connection with their ECOA 
affirmative defense.  However, this claim is of no moment 
because, as we discuss infra, we agree with the district court 
that Mrs. Hansen was a joint applicant. 
  
 Our review of a district court's entry of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Public Interest Research of NJ v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).  In 
reviewing the entry of summary judgment, we take the non-movant's 
allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-
movant.  Berner Int'l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 The ECOA was enacted to protect consumers from 
discrimination by financial institutions.  See United States v. 
Am. Future Sys., Inc., 743 F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1984).  In 
particular, the ECOA provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for 
any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect 
to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of . . . 
marital status."  15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1).  To further protect 
consumers, Regulation B, promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board 
pursuant to the ECOA, provides that "a creditor shall not require 
the signature of an applicant's spouse or other person, other 
than a joint applicant, on any credit instrument if the applicant 
qualifies under the creditor's standards of creditworthiness for 
the amount and terms of the credit requested."  12 C.F.R. 
§ 202.7(d)(1) (1992) (emphasis supplied).  A "joint applicant" is 
"someone who applies contemporaneously with the applicant for 
shared or joint credit" and not someone "whose signature is 
required by the creditor as a condition for granting the credit 
requested."  Official Staff Interpretation to § 202.7(d)(1). 
 The Hansens claim that Mr. Hansen was the "only true 
applicant" for the Midlantic loans and that Midlantic therefore 
  
violated the ECOA when it required Mrs. Hansen to co-sign the 
loan applications.  The district court disagreed with the 
Hansens' ECOA argument, finding, as a matter of fact, that: 
 Mrs. Hansen was a co-owner of HBI, the 
holding company that acquired the Florida and 
New Jersey banks and whose stock was pledged 
to secure acquisition financing.  The Hansens 
submitted consolidated statements of income 
and net worth for their loan application and 
included an explanatory note which detailed 
the joint ownership of their assets.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, G. 
Eileen Hansen and Elmer F. Hansen, Jr. are 
both parties to the Acquisition Agreement for 
Raritan Savings Bank, the first bank acquired 
through Midlantic financing.  While Mrs. 
Hansen may not have had a major role in the 
day-to-day operations of HBI or any of its 
subsidiary banks, she clearly had an equal 
stake with Mr. Hansen in the assets which 
secured Defendants' borrowing.  Under these 
circumstances, Mrs. Hansen was a bona fide 
joint applicant for the loans and the ECOA 
does not protect her from liability upon 
plaintiff's claims in this suit. 
(D.Ct. op. January 6, 1993 at 10; Pa. at 538). 
 The district court observed that this case differed 
from other cases in which violations of the ECOA or Regulation B 
were found to have occurred.  In those cases, the district court 
noted, the spouses who were required to sign the notes were not 
connected to the underlying transactions for which the loans were 
sought.  See, e.g., Marine American State Bank v. Lincoln, 433 
N.W.2d 709, 711 (Iowa 1988) (wives of applicants neither officers 
nor shareholders in business and had no material participation in 
its activities); American Security Bank v. York, 1992 WL 237375 
(D. D.C. Sept. 1, 1992) (applicants applied for loan for their 
  
business; wives had no ownership interest in business and played 
no role in loan negotiations). 
 We agree with the district court that Mrs. Hansen was a 
"joint applicant."  Though the Hansens claim that Mr. Hansen 
sought the loans alone, several of the loans were for the 
purchase and financing of Raritan, of which the Hansens were 
joint purchasers.  All of the assets listed on the statement of 
net worth supplied to Midlantic for the loan to purchase Raritan 
were jointly owned.  The list of loans the Hansens applied for 
and the affidavit of Barbara Parker, the Midlantic employee who 
served as account officer for Raritan, indicate that the Hansens 
jointly purchased Raritan and that Midlantic relied on documents 
setting forth jointly owned properties in granting the loan (Da. 
at 195).  In addition, there were loans for the Florida and New 
Jersey thrifts, subsidiaries of HBI, of which the Hansens were 
the joint owners.  Furthermore, contrary to the Hansens' 
assertion that Mrs. Hansen had nothing to do with the business, 
the statement of net worth stated, "E.F. Jr. and G. Eileen 
Hansen, his wife, operate their business, Hansen Properties 
("Hansen") as a sole proprietorship."  (Pa. at 486).  Finally, 
even though there were no properties pledged that were solely 
owned by Mrs. Hansen (indeed she had no income and no substantial 
assets of her own (Hansen affidavit, Pa. at 391)), all properties 
pledged were jointly owned.  These facts constitute powerful 
evidence that the Midlantic loans were jointly applied for and 
were secured by jointly owned assets and compel the conclusion 
that Mrs. Hansen, at the very least, was a de facto joint 
  
applicant for the loans in question.  See Riggs National Bank of 
Washington, D.C. v. Webster, 832 F. Supp. 147, 151 (D. Md. 1993) 
(wife of individual loan applicant held to be a de facto joint 
applicant where loan was for refinancing and renovation of a 
building owned by her and financial statement submitted by 
applicant included both jointly owned properties and properties 
she solely owned). 
 V. 
 Having determined that we have, and the district court 
had, jurisdiction over this case, and for the above-stated  
  
reasons, we will affirm the district court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Midlantic and against the Hansens and HBI. 
  
Midlantic National Bank v. E. F. Hansen, Jr.;  
G. Eileen Hansen; Hansen Bancorp, Inc. 
Nos. 93-5120 & 93-5160 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge, dubitante. 
 I agree with the majority that our court has appellate 
jurisdiction of these appeals.  However, I have serious doubt as 
to the standard that should be adopted by our court to determine  
the citizenship of an inactive corporation for diversity 
jurisdiction purposes. 
 The diversity statute, which confers jurisdiction on 
federal courts in certain circumstances, is of considerable age.  
Its principal purpose is to provide a federal forum where out of 
state citizens, including corporations, could presumably avoid 
the prejudices of local courts and juries. 
 Before 1958, a corporation was deemed a citizen of the 
state in which it was incorporated for purposes of diversity.  In 
the 1950s, Congress became concerned with the ease with which 
corporations removed essentially "local" cases to the federal 
courts based solely on their place of incorporation.10  In 1958, 
Congress amended the diversity statute to provide that "a 
corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which 
it has been incorporated and of the State in which it has its 
principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (amended 
                     
10
.  The legislative history to the 1958 amendment of section 
1332(c) centered around the perceived evil of allowing an 
essentially local corporation to remove a case to the federal 
court simply because the corporate charter was obtained in 
another state. See S. REP. NO. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3102. 
  
portion emphasized).  However, neither the amendment itself nor 
the legislative history to section 1332(c) refers to the 
citizenship of an inactive corporation. 
 The general view in the federal courts that have 
addressed the present issue is that an inactive corporation is a 
citizen of both the state where it is incorporated and the state 
where it had its last principal place of business. See, e.g., 
Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992); Wm. 
Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South Inc., 933 
F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991).11  This rule seems to embrace Congress' 
intent to deny a federal forum to "local" corporations in actions 
involving local citizens.  
 On the other hand, the majority's bright line test 
certainly has simplicity to recommend it, and it may reflect the 
reality that an inactive corporation has no business activities, 
let alone a principal place of business.  However, the rule seems 
to run counter to the congressional purpose underlying the 1958 
amendment to the diversity statute. 
 The issue here is one that Congress should address.  
After weighing the conflicting considerations, I remain doubtful 
as to the proper application of section 1332(c).  In view of my 
                     
11
.    In Harris, the Fifth Circuit adopting a more flexible 
approach, stated, "[A]s a matter of law, where a corporation has 
been inactive in a state for a substantial period of time, in 
this case five years, that state is not the corporation's 
principal place of business." Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 (footnote 
omitted).  The court added that the question of substantiality 
must be determined case-by-case. Id. at 551 n.10. 
  
doubt, it would serve no purpose for me to address the other 
issues in the case. 
 
 
 
  
 
